

# Transnational Islamic Movement: The Da'wah Movement of Salafism in Southeast Sulawesi

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**Abstract:** This article reports on research conducted through observations, document studies, and in-depth interviews, with several Salafi activists in Southeast Sulawesi regarding the strategy of da'wah movement. Using a phenomenological hermeneutic approach, this study has revealed that the traces of salafism in Southeast Sulawesi began in 1998 when a number of Middle Eastern alumni from this area returned and became agents of spreading the idea of salafism in Southeast Sulawesi. Furthermore, the growth of Salafi communities is attributed to effective institutional management, particularly their ability to mobilize da'wah resources and establish communication with external parties. However, other Salafi communities tend to remain rigid, prioritizing stability and consistency in adhering to the manhaj sunnah.

**Keywords:** Islam, transnationalism, da'wah movement, salafism, Sulawesi.

**Abstrak:** Artikel ini melaporkan hasil penelitian yang dilakukan melalui observasi, studi dokumen, dan wawancara mendalam, dengan beberapa aktivis Salafi di Sulawesi Tenggara mengenai strategi gerakan dakwah. Dengan menggunakan pendekatan hermeneutik fenomenologis, penelitian ini telah mengungkap bahwa jejak salafisme di Sulawesi Tenggara dimulai pada tahun 1998 ketika sejumlah alumni Timur Tengah dari daerah ini kembali dan menjadi agen penyebaran gagasan salafisme di Sulawesi Tenggara. Lebih jauh, pertumbuhan komunitas Salafi dikaitkan dengan manajemen kelembagaan yang efektif, khususnya kemampuan mereka untuk memobilisasi sumber daya dakwah dan membangun komunikasi dengan pihak eksternal. Namun, komunitas Salafi lainnya cenderung tetap kaku, mengutamakan stabilitas dan konsistensi dalam berpegang pada manhaj sunnah.

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## Introduction

Salafi is one of the transnationalist Islamic movements that has attracted the attention of observers, researchers and academics. This movement is cross-border, with a singular allegiance: only to Islam. The word "*salafi*" comes from the Arabic *salaf*; etymologically it means the past or has happened in the past (Ma'luf, 1986, p.346). From the word *salaf*, then the terms *Salafiah*, *Salafiyun* and *Salafi* developed. *Salafiah* is a treasure trove of knowledge or teachings of *salafussaleh* (*pious ancestors*); *Salafiyun* (singular form: Salafi) are people who follow the teachings of *salafussaleh* (al-Thalibi, 2006, 8; Warson, 1997). Along with its development, *Salafiah* then metamorphosed into a separate Islamic understanding that was built or relied on religious reasoning which was practiced by the companions of the Prophet Muhammad in the past (Al-Buthy, 1998, p.9). Thus salafi is a religious concept based on the phenomenon of early Islamic practice (the practice of companions and *tabi'in*) which they characterize as an ideal religious model.

The process of spreading the *salaf* school of thought is called *the Salafi movement*, which has a core call for Muslims to return to the purity of *aqidah*, as was the practice of the companions of the Prophet. A number of analyzes say that the Salafi movement is actually another name for the Wahhabi movement that developed in Saudi Arabia. Genealogically, Salafi thought can be traced as follows: Salafus shaleh—Ibn Taymiyah—Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab—Saudi and Yemeni Ulama.

The choice of the Salafi theme is not without reason, especially considering the empirical social facts, showing that the Salafi movement in this region is very advanced not to say that it goes beyond the activities of mainstream Islamic movements such as Muhammadiyah and NU (Zainal, 2016, p.iv). Another reason for this theme, considering that in a number of literatures the Salafi group is seen as a "fundamentalist" movement, it does not even categorize it as a "radical" Islamic movement (Wictorowicz, 2006) (Ahmed, 2003, p.43). This categorization is often the argument to justify the

supervision of the Salafi movement (Azra, 2017). Based on this reality, the researcher considers it important to study in depth about the growth and development, distribution and how the salafi community approach packs Islamic ideas that they believe in so as to invite sympathy and followers in Southeast Sulawesi.

Studies of Salafis in various perspectives have been carried out by many researchers. Wictorowicz (2006, p.207) describes "*Anatomy of the Salafi Movement*," Brigaglia (2015, p.5) writes about: *The Volatility of Salafi Political Theology, the War on Terror and the Genesis of Boko Haram*. The two studies described, briefly show the Salafi movement which not only influences the Islamic perspective of Indonesian society but also in other countries. In the national context, Salafis were raised in Hassan's (2008) research on *Laskar Jihad: Islamist Militant and the Search for Identity after the New Order*. According to him, Laskar Jihad was not originally a political Salafi movement, but over time the group metamorphosed into a political Salafi movement. In the local context of Southeast Sulawesi (Sultra), an analytic description of salafism was carried out by Alim, among others. The focus of his study is on religious singularity as identification of radical schools and understandings in kendari by taking samples of the salafi Wahdah Islamiyah (WI) and the Islamic Center Muadz Bin Jabal (ICM). Alim concluded that the two groups were purely da'wah movements, both contributed positively to the social field in Kendari, and acknowledged the existence of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Alim, 2018, p.217).

Hassan and Alim's studies provide valuable information about the Salafi movement, both in national and local contexts. However, Hassan's study focuses more on the figure of Jafar Umar Talib, while Alim's study focuses on the ideology of WI and ICM. In addition, the two studies have not placed salafi as a social movement, so the implications are not clearly illustrated sociologically. Namely what conditions make the salafi with all its ideas survive, develop and spread, both in national and local contexts. This study takes a different position from the two previous studies, namely focusing on the

framework of social movements, by looking at the development of the salafi movement through three factors, namely *political opportunity structures, framing process, and resource mobilization*. One study that deserves consideration despite being at a different locus, tempo, and focus is Hidayat's (2012) and Munsond's (2016) research on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. This study is important considering that the theoretical basis used is similar to this study.

A social movement is an organized collective action, oriented to "against" any authority, both institutional/structural and cultural. Snow mentions social movements not only make the State the only focus, because in essence the State is not the only *source of power and authority*, but includes a number of authorities from various institutions that are integrated in society (Snow, 2004, p.9). There are three elements that has a significant effect in social activities, namely

- a. *Political Opportunity Spaces/Structure (POS)*, is a multidimensional space that not only provides opportunities for the growth of social movements , but can also hinder the development of social movements over a period of time (Benford, 2000, . p.286; 2009; Kriesi, 2004, p.70). The last condition occurs when the *political structure* is repressive.
- b. *Resource mobilization theory*, this is where the social movement is actualized, because dissatisfaction with the existing socio-cultural situation means nothing without a group of people (social institutions) trying to carry out mobilization activities which of course rely on existing resources.
- c. *Social Framing* is an interpretive framework that directs one to locate, understand, identify and name events that occur in social life around them and in a wider environment. *Frames* play a role in helping people disentangle each event into a meaningful experience, as well as organizing those experiences plus providing guidance for action.

With these three factors, this study seeks to examine the structural phenomena that provide opportunities for salafi to develop and

describe the role of actors in packaging ideology (framing) and mobilizing resources.

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This research is descriptive analytic by using qualitative data. The data in this study were obtained through in-depth interviews with a number of salafi figures in Southeast Sulawesi, observations and document studies. Interviews were conducted in a non-standard but focused manner (Koentjaraningrat, 1973, pp.162-4). A data analysis is carried out by Keep going continuously, throughout the process conducted encoder to things found based on context and perspective participants (Gay, & Airasian, 2012, p.29). The procedure taken, refers to mechanism analysis developed by Matthew B Miles and Huberman combined with method phenomenology from von Eckartsberg (Lotto, 1986) (Moustakas, 1994, p.15).

## Methodology

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### The Presence and Presence of Twentieth Century Salafism in Southeast Sulawesi

The transnational Islamic movement in Indonesia is an integral part of the Islamic revivalism movement in the Middle East. This movement in fact has a direct effect on the pattern of Islam in Indonesia (Aksa, 2017, p.1). One of the transnational Islamic movements that developed in Indonesia is twentieth century salafism or also known as modern salafi. This term was actualized by Nashiruddin Al-Albani (1914-1999) in the 1960s in Medina, through a community (*jamaah*) known as Jamaah al-Salafiyah al-Muhtasibah. The Salafi teachings developed by Al-Albani are in principle equivalent to the Wahhabi doctrine. That is a religious perspective that seeks to purify Islamic teachings by eliminating everything that is considered to contain elements of *shirk*, superstition, *bid'ah* and superstition (Hassan, p.35) (Lacroix, 2009, pp.58-80).

## Result and Discussions

Long before the emergence of the modern salafi movement as it develops in Indonesia today, in Southeast Sulawesi there has been an Islamic purification movement, namely Muhammadiyah. As a purification movement, Muhammadiyah also tends to be salaf, but the roots of Muhammadiyah's purification perspective are more directed at eradicating the mentality of taqlid and jumud as Abduh and Rida's point of view in understanding the salaf.

That is an effort to reform the moral, cultural and political conditions of Muslims (Esposito, p.106). Therefore, even though the reality of the existence of a purification movement represented by Muhammadiyah has manifested itself in Southeast Sulawesi since 1929-1930 (Depdikbud, 1980), but based on a number of researches, Salafism which is currently rife in Southeast Sulawesi is not a transformation of the Muhammadiyah movement (Alifuddin, 2021) (Saprihah, 2017). Thus, the salafism that is now developing in Southeast Sulawesi is a direct impact of the development of the transnational Islamic movement and is an inseparable part of the Wahhabi movement based in Saudi, and or which has been re-actualized by a number of scholars based in Saudi and Yemen.

As a movement that carries the idea of purification, Salafism is very aggressive and proactive in grounding its ideas. This reality is closely related to the doctrine of this movement, namely to carry out Islamic purification steps in the socio-cultural space (Jawwaz, 2016). For this reason, the agents of salafism continue to move through time and place in order to ground the salaf understanding as well as to hack the understanding of the people, which according to them in many cases and events still shows syirik, bid'ah, takhyul and khurafat practices. Driven by this spirit of purification, salafism was echoed in Indonesia to the point of probing into Southeast Sulawesi.

Referring to the explanations of a number of informants, data was obtained that the history of the manifestation of Salafism in Southeast Sulawesi began in the latter half of 1998, through a man named Abu Izi (AI) (Baa, interview). The view of the early arrival of salafism in Southeast Sulawesi, as mentioned above, is combined with the general

perspective on the existence of transnational Islamic movements in the archipelago, which states that although Islamic movements such as salafism, HTI and tarbiyah have spread their influence in the country in the 80s, the It found its momentum during the reformation period, namely in 1998 (Chozin, 2013, p.22).

At the beginning of his arrival, AI as one of the main actors of early Salafism in Southeast Sulawesi formed kholaqoh/recitations around the UHO campus, precisely in the Turikale hallway. This method is taken by AI in addition to aiming to strengthen the existence of salafism, as well as an effort to form a congregation at the grassroots level. This pattern is actually a general pattern that is carried out by every religious organ, when trying to instill its influence in the social space (Aksa, 2017, p.1). Starting from the existence of AI by establishing an as-sunnah institution, Salafism as a religious perspective, slowly but surely attracted the interest of a number of Muslims in Southeast Sulawesi. After the presence of AI, a number of communities have emerged that bind themselves to the notion of Salafism in this region.

As a *da'wah* movement inheriting the Wahhabi tradition, salafism is known as a da'wah movement with a "radical" puritan theological ideology (Wiktorowicz 2001; 2004). The call to return to the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet is the main agenda of this movement. Esposito (2002, p.104) mentions that *da'wah* emphasizes 10 things, four of which are highly emphasized, namely purification of aqidah, reviving the sunnah, eradicating heresy and *tasfiyah* (purification of scientific treasures). In this context, it can be understood why contemporary salaf network groups are very "aggressive" in developing their religious understanding in the public sphere. The aggressiveness of the Salaf network in countering the understanding that they see is contaminated with elements of shirk and heresy, in the portrait frame of past history can be seen in the Padri movement in West Sumatra (Nashir, 2008, p.219), (Padmo, 2007, p.154). Just as the priestly movement was called to mobilize the purification of Islam in Minang, seeing that there had been deviations from religious practice at that

time, it is no exaggeration to say that the arrival and presence of salafi preachers in every region, including in Southeast Sulawesi, was also encouraged by the spirit to carry out purification.

The above view is not without reason, especially if it is related to the fact that although Islam as a belief has been embraced in Southeast Sulawesi since 1542 (Alifuddin, 2006) but until the end of the nineteenth century the religious pattern of the people of Southeast Sulawesi, both those in the Buton and Muna islands and those in the South Sulawesi. Live on the mainland of Southeast Sulawesi, more towards a syncretic pattern. That is a pattern of religious practice that combines Islamic traditions with rituals based on local traditions (Kemendikbud, 1980). This pattern is strongly opposed by the Salafism movement because it is seen as containing elements of superstition, heresy, superstition. For the salafi community, such a phenomenon is a reality that must be rectified through da'wah in order to revive the sunnah and at the same time free the community from the potential spread of syirik, bid'ah, takhyul, and khurafat.

### **The Growth of Salafism in Southeast Sulawesi**

As an integral part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, the social and cultural atmosphere of Southeast Sulawesi, like other regions, is also strongly influenced by the dynamics of national politics that have been, and are currently developing. The reality of the openness of the Indonesian political system after the 1998 reform, empirically provides a wide space and opportunity for every community to develop innovative ideas with positive content in the social space.

This space and opportunity was enthusiastically welcomed by various groups by establishing various organizations, both political (political parties) and organizations engaged in social, cultural and religious fields. In the context of socio-religious life, the realm of reform gave rise to many religious organs outside of mainstream Islamic organs. Before the 1998 reformation, religious groups were still dominated by Muhammadiyah, NU, PERSIS, Al-Irsyad, Al-

Washiliyah and several local Islamic social organs, then after 1998 the Islamic religious social organs in Indonesia developed into more variety.

The diversity of socio-religious organs after the 1998 reformation period was marked by the development of religious study groups in the community and campus environment. One of the Islamic socio-religious groups showing significant progress is a group that identifies itself as a follower of the salaf. Although the origins of the Salaf movement in the archipelago can be traced long before the independence period, it cannot be denied that significant developments of this movement occurred in the reform era. Various foundations or organs that identify themselves as followers of the salafus shalihin have sprung up in the archipelago, both on a large and small scale. This reality also approaches the natural environment of Southeast Sulawesi. As an inseparable part of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, Southeast Sulawesi, like other regions in the archipelago, is one of the missionary goals of the salafi movement.

In reality now, in almost all urban districts in Southeast Sulawesi, there are recitation groups based on salafi ideology. The salafi community is active in embodying religious concepts which they believe to be active and progressive, thus making this movement experience rapid growth. The quantitative indication of the above statement is at least seen in the presence of a number of salafi "ideology"-based institutions and foundations. Based on the researcher's field notes, until 2022 there will be at least 10 (ten) salafi institutions. Namely Minhajus Sunnah (MS) Wahdah Islamiyah (WI) Islamic Center Muadz bin Jabal (ICM). Ar-Risalah, Al-Fath, Ibn Abbas (IA), Darul Ilmi (DI), Taifah Mansurah (TM), Firqatun Najiyah (FN) and Minhaju Aksar (MA).

All of the groups mentioned above, exist, grow and develop independently. Each group establishes and develops educational institutions, especially tahfiz Quran education. Generally, in the area of salafi educational institutions, they are designed to be integrated with mosques. These mosques were built as an epicenter in transmitting

salafi teachings, through regularly scheduled recitations. These mosques, apart from being a means of da'wah, are also used as a place to implement the practice of Islam based on salafi ideology.

From the 10 salafi groups that have developed their influence in this region, based on the observations of researchers, there are two fairly large groups, namely WI and ICM. WI is a national-scale salafi organ based in Makassar. Historically, WI was first present in the Southeast Sulawesi region in 2002 in Muna and then existed in Kendari in 2006. Until now, WI has almost spread throughout the Regency of the City of Southeast Sulawesi. Namely in Kendari, Konawe, South Konawe, Bombana, Kolaka, North and East Kolaka, Muna, West Muna, Bau-Bau and Wakatobi and in every place/region where WI exists, they have educational infrastructure.

Meanwhile, ICM has mosque infrastructure, educational facilities in Kendari and Wakatobi. Although it does not yet have anchors in other regencies in Southeast Sulawesi such as WI, ICM has taken several steps forward not to say "superior" when compared to other salafi groups or even when compared to mainstream socio-religious organs such as NU and Muhammadiyah. This organ not only develops its da'wah through mosques and educational institutions but also through the Muadz TV network and Muadz FM Radio. Starting 2022, the ICM congregation again made history by establishing health services to the community in the form of a main polyclinic.

Meanwhile, other salafi groups are more developed around Kendari and have not yet penetrated other areas. The facts as stated explicitly show that the growth of the salafi movement in Southeast Sulawesi is fairly rapid quantitatively. In the last 10 years, the Southeast Sulawesi salafi da'wah movement has become more intense, so it is very possible that in the following periods, the number of salafi congregations in Southeast Sulawesi quantitatively has the potential to increase more and more. This reality can be seen at least in their ability to grow and develop across borders, looking into the social field with a background of rural and coastal culture.

The presence of salafism to the outermost areas of Southeast Sulawesi as seen in Buton and the Wakatobi Islands, shows that salafism has now penetrated the area of the traditional Islamic culture base. In Wakatobi there are at least two salafi communities that develop da'wah activities. Namely WI and ICM, the presence of both of them in Wakatobi, did not just spread the idea of salafime verbally (lectures/da'wah bi al-lisan). The two organs move with real and measurable steps in the Wakatobi people's area. Namely by facilitating the implementation of education at the level of junior and senior high schools based on tahfiz Quran for the related community. The implementation of educational media from the two institutions in Wakatobi, in fact, cannot be separated from the existence of financial support from the Middle East (Khilakl and al-Walid, interview). On this basis, WI and ICM can easily build educational facilities and infrastructure in Wakatobi.

Qualitatively, the infrastructure of houses of worship and educational institutions owned by WI and ICM is beyond or much larger, majestic and aesthetically pleasing when compared to buildings belonging to organizations like Muhammadiyah. ICM built a mosque and educational facilities on an area of more than 3 h (Khilal, interview). Likewise, WI built the same thing even though it was not as big and grand as ICM. The presence of ICM in Wakatobi can be said to be a sign of the emergence of educational institutions that are integrated with tahfiz learning. This institution is quite instrumental in giving birth to the seeds of memorizing the Quran in the Tukang Besi islands. Alumni of Muadz Wakatobi Middle School students are generally able or have the ability to memorize 6 Juz. In 2022 a number of female high school students can complete or memorize 30 Juz (ibid).

### *The Spread and Influence of Salafism in Southeast Sulawesi*

After the 1998 reform movement, the current wave of transnationalist Islamic movements increasingly stretched in the space of the Indonesian socio-cultural system (Chozin, 2013, 21). In

addition to the tarbiyah movement, HTI, the salafi movement can be said to be an Islamic movement with significant developments and wide spread in various places, including in Southeast Sulawesi. Kendari as the center of civilization in Southeast Sulawesi Province, has become one of the strategic places for the salafi community to sow religious understanding through various activities. From Kendari City, Salafism was transmitted to a number of regions in Southeast Sulawesi. Referring to the description of the growth and development of the salafi movement in Southeast Sulawesi, it clearly shows that salafi understanding in this region has spread widely across geographical and cultural boundaries. This is shown by the establishment of representatives /agents of salafi from various groups in almost all regencies and cities in Southeast Sulawesi.

Therefore, if it was previously assumed that the movement of salafism was limited to people in urban areas and around the campus environment, then that reality has shifted. Now cities, campuses, villages and even islands far from urban areas, have now been entered by the influence of Salafism (Krismono, 2017). In the Southeast Sulawesi region, the phenomenon can be seen in the presence of Salafism on Blacksmith islands.

The success of Salafism in spreading influence so that it can expand its distribution in Southeast Sulawesi, is closely related to the persistence of Salafism agents in accusing the idea of purification in the community. The idea of purification was transmitted by salafi preachers in a number of mosques, especially in mosques whose establishment was initiated by salafi groups. The transmission of salafi ideas is generally spearheaded by Middle Eastern alumni who come from Southeast Sulawesi and/or imported. Middle East alumni, especially those from Southeast Sulawesi, after completing their studies, took the initiative to become agents of Salafism in this place.

Wahyudin said that the movement and teachings of salafi ideology into Indonesia were estimated to be widespread around the 80s, generally brought by students who had studied from the Middle East, especially alumni of universities in Saudi and Yemen, plus alumni

of LIPIA Jakarta. They then spread to various regions to become *muballigh* by establishing da'wah and educational institutions and even finally managed to enter the parliament (Wahyudin, 2021, p.416).

The concepts and ideas of salafism, apart from being conveyed directly in recitation events at mosques based on salafi influence, are also spread through information communication technology facilities. Da'wah videos from salaf agents are routinely and massively transmitted by salafi followers through social media. In the context of Kendari's social space, the presence of TV and FM Radio Muadz are very effective tools in embodying salafi understanding. As the only private TV and radio facilities belonging to Islamic organs, TV and FM Radio Muadz whether we like it or not are now dominating the seeding of Islamic teachings through mainstream media in Kendari City. The breadth of reach and cruising of TV and radio broadcasts makes the concept of religion based on salafism quickly spread among the people.

### *Democratization as a Space for the Salafist Movement*

During the New Order era, the government carried out strict supervision of the growth and development of social organs, even though at this time the Saudis were successful in negotiating the establishment of LPBA/LIPIA. This institution became an effective route for a number of Indonesian students to study in the Middle East, especially Saudi, and subsequently became a mouthpiece for salafi da'wah in Indonesia. Therefore, it can be stated that, although the New Order was closed to the growth and development of social movements, at this time the consolidation of salafism began to build and subsequently found room for growth and development during the reformation period.

Historically traces of modern salafi activities in Indonesia have been found in the 1980s, but this movement found its positive momentum during the reform period, after the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998. In the reform era, the government provided an opportunity for every social element to develop positive expression and

intentions in the community. This momentum is used and used as a valuable opportunity by the salafi da'wah movement to expand to various regions including Southeast Sulawesi Based on written data and the narratives of a number of author informants, it is stated that the Salafi movement entered Southeast Sulawesi in 1998. This reality shows a positive correlation between the 1998 reforms and the growth and development of the Salafi movement in Southeast Sulawesi. The above perspective is supported by empirical facts, that after the 1998 reformation, the salafi da'wah became more massive in Southeast Sulawesi, especially after the WI community expanded to Southeast Sulawesi in 2002. Apart from WI, the salafi movement which campaigned heavily for salafi ideology was the ICM group under the management of Zezen Zainal Mursalim.

### *Framing in the Salafi Da'wah Movement*

For the salafi community, the root of the downturn of Muslims is because the majority of the people have far deviated from the Qur'an, sunnah and pure aqidah, so that they fall into heretical sects. This situation causes Muslims to split into many firqahs and commit acts of heresy (deviating from the sunnah). The concept and factual structure of the condition of the Muslims as described above, by the salafi preacher is continuously injected into the subconscious of the salafi congregation. In the concept of framing, the description of the slumping position of Muslims is called diagnostic. The mapping is similar to the work of a doctor to find out the cause of a patient's illness. By understanding the state of adversity as described, it is hoped that it will trigger the spirit of the congregation to move to actualize religious patterns based on the practice of the salaf al-sholih.

By knowing the socio-cultural conditions that caused the decline of Muslims from the orbit of the historical stage of human civilization in this century, further action that must be taken is to carry out prognostication. The conceptual step in this phase is to carry out systematic creative actions and efforts to overcome the problem in question. In this step, the driving actors must develop and systematize

various methods that allow them to be used as "tools" or means of "denial" as well as encourage solution steps that can be used by the people to restore the glory and brilliance of Islamic civilization. The solution line that is prescribed in order to restore the superiority of Islamic civilization is to return to the Sunnah of the Quran.

This recipe in the perspective of Salafism undoubtedly refers to the concept of understanding the Quran and Sunnah as practiced by the Companions and two generations after it. Another thing that must be strengthened is the pure *aqidah* base of monotheism, in the sense that it is free from elements that have the potential to cause people to fall into traditions that contain shirk. This perspective is echoed and colored the da'wah of the salafi community in public spaces, including in Southeast Sulawesi. Islam as a solution to contemporary civilization, in principle, is part of the "campaign" of the majority of Islamic organs. In general, the Muslim community views the downfall of Muslims that occurred in the last few centuries as an implication of the entry or adoption of the western secularism system into the body of today's ummah civilization.

The difference is that at its pressure point, the salafi movement emphasizes the downturn as a result of the fragile values of *tawhid*. Understand that many Muslims deviate from pure monotheism so that at the same time they are trapped in the space of shirk. It is also stated more explicitly that the grip of monotheism which is a phenomenon in the body of Muslims is far or even no longer refers to the understanding of the *shalihin salaf*. In that context, the salafi community sees the urgency to continue to carry out the purification of monotheism so that people are protected from shirk practices, superstition, heresy and superstition. In a number of cases the method as mentioned is effective in "provoking" the subconscious of some Muslim communities, especially those whose religious understanding base is "minimal". However, this is not the case for the "santri" group, this second group in fact sometimes becomes the antithesis of the salafi movement. Zainal mentions that the success of salafi *da'wah* in

Southeast Sulawesi is because the cultural basis of the people in this region is not based on santri like in Java (Zainal, 2016).

### *Mobilization of Da'wah Resources*

General, resources are interpreted as everything that has a range of beneficial values owned by individuals or social groups that can be controlled and controlled and used collectively for the purpose of the organization's vision and mission (Opp, 2009, 139). Edwards and McCharty divide resources into several types. Namely: (1). Moral resources, (2) Cultural resources, (3). Social organization resources, (4). Human resources, and (5). Material resources (Edward, 2004, p.117).

### *Moral and Cultural Resources*

The framing of the urgency of adhering to the Quran and Sunnah based on the understanding of the companions, plus keeping people away from shirk and heresy, has in certain contexts succeeded in raising the spirit of the salafi community in Southeast Sulawesi. This spirit can be mobilized elegantly by the main actors from each salafi movement in Southeast Sulawesi. The impact of mobilizing the spirit of reviving the sunnah in the personality of salafi members is the birth of the moral strength to socialize and implement salafi understanding in the community.

Moral strength and self-confidence as intended at least can be seen in their ability to look stylish in Middle Eastern style. Dressed in a robe combined with a choice of models with pants above the ankles. Meanwhile, the women's community chose to dress in a jubbah and some of them wore a veil. They display their existence without being awkward, even though they are often ridiculed and even stigmatized as part of a "radical" group. The moral strength is born from the spirit to be part of *firqah an-najiyah* as a gift to revive the Sunnah. The spirit is framed and mobilized so that it is effective in encouraging the moral and culture of the salafi community to build and develop the wings of its movement in Southeast Sulawesi (Meijer, 2009, p.13).

The author views that the mobilization of da'wah of the salafi community which is consolidated by the spirit of reviving the sunnah, surpasses the influence of the spirit of the NU and Muhammadiyah communities. The assumption above is not without reason, empirically in the last 10 years, the actors of the salafi movement are better able to attract the subject of da'wah (the community) into the area of salafi-style understanding of Islam. Another fact is at least shown by WI and ICM who are very aggressive in surfing in public spaces. The two salafi organs mentioned, almost dominate the constellation of the da'wah movement, especially in Kendari City. This phenomenon can be seen at least in the trend of the proliferation of recitation congregations based on the guidance of the salafi community. According to Yusup, as of April 2022, in the records of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) of Kendari City, there are 40 mosques whose Friday preacher services are now managed by the ICM salafi community, and this number is estimated to be higher when added to the services provided by the salafi community network.

### *Human Resources*

In the researcher's field notes, there are at least ten salafi communities who are trying to ground the salafism paradigm in the people of Southeast Sulawesi. In their work in the social space, it turns out that not all salafi communities as mentioned above can exist and survive at the same time. In plain view, the WI and ICM salafi communities show faster progress than other salafi communities. The indicators of this conclusion can be seen at least from the number of congregations and the physical supporting infrastructure they have.

The progressive growth and development of salafi WI and ICM cannot be separated from the management vision and experience of the actors behind these organs. The phenomenon of WI and ICM is slightly different from other salafi groups such as Minhajus Sunnah, Darul Ilmi etc. Objectively it can be said that even though some salafi groups are growing, they are not as fast as WI and ICM. The resource factor in this case is the main actor from Darul Ilmi who impressed

"rigid" in understanding the work patterns of modern organizational systems, allegedly contributing significantly to making this community less developed when compared to WI and ICM. Even though this community explicitly requires obedience to the legitimate government, this group seems to negate the importance of registering its organization in accordance with the provisions of the state administration system as it applies to every organization. For this group, organizing formally has the potential to bring deviations from the doctrine of salafism and can lead the perpetrators to hizbiyah.

In addition, the creation of a formal structure as seen in every organization, according to them, is feared to have an impact on the emergence of slander, because the structure will in turn be contested so that it is easy to trigger conflict (Hasnur, interview). The phenomenon of progress and stagnation shown by the salafi community in Southeast Sulawesi, according to the author, is closely related to the "quality" of human resources that oversees each community.

Quality in this context refers to aspects of the managerial ability of the movers of each organ. The track record and experience of interacting in a wider social space is one of the valuable assets in moving the wheels of the organization. Social interaction with various parties carried out by management subjects is also an effective trigger for the growth and development of insight into social movement actors. The openness of the management of the da'wah movement will in turn encourage related organs to build collaboration with various social elements, especially to policy makers (PEMDA) (Tajuddin, 2013, p.215). This pattern seems to be followed by WI and ICM in developing their organization in the Southeast Sulawesi area, on the contrary, other salafi groups have not followed it.

WI and ICM forward movement as seen now because these organs are more open and slowly "away" from exclusivity. Kapai mentioned that WI is an Islamic organ that carries the moderate salafi paradigm (interview). The salafi WI phenomenon as shown by its celebrities no longer questions elementary things such as how one should look in clothes. With an Indonesian-style appearance, WI has

the impression of being more open and not requiring the use of a jubah (Arabic model) in appearance. This reality also shows that the human resources of WI understand well which substance of religious teachings must be maintained and which things can change according to the cultural conditions of each subject.

In addition to the intellectual capacity of the main actor, another thing that cannot be ignored for his contribution in expanding the network of the salafi da'wah movement in Southeast Sulawesi is the ideological strength of its members. Hegghammer mentions in a time of great changes and constant choices and with its simple certainty, Salafism is able to build strong belief among the younger generation who are looking for an ideal religious model. Not only that, with its claim to be *al-firqah al-nâjîyah*, salafism has become a magnet for groups of oppressed people, discriminated against migrants, and people who are politically marginalized, because they feel they have access to the truth (Meijer, 2009, p.13).

The ideological power that is instilled through the doctrine of *al-firqah al-nâjîyah* becomes a grinding stone in sharpening the vision and mission of the members of this movement so that it becomes the potential capital of the salafi community. Likewise, the doctrine of love for the *sunnah* and anti-*bid'ah* (*al-walla wa al-barra*) and the obligation to live the *sunnah* in the public sphere is one of the triggers for this group to continue surfing in social spaces. The mission of reviving the *sunnah* and extinguishing the fire of heresy continues to be injected into the salafi congregation so that the resources that move at the grassroots work tirelessly (Krismono, p.179). However, the understanding of *sunnah* love and anti-*bid'ah* as salafi doctrine if it is not managed more generously, in turn has the potential to keep the perpetrators of this movement away from the surrounding community. Even more counter-productive, the doctrine of *al-walla wa al-barra* in a number of cases sometimes moves the salafi community to withdraw from social life, citing concerns that it will be contaminated with heretical behavior that is spreading in society. That is why in the interest of fortifying themselves from the dangers of heresy which (of

course in the perception of the salafi community), encourages a number of salafi groups to live and live in the same area or complex.

*Material Resource: Salafi Funds and Financial Access*

One indicator of the empowerment of social organs is the extent to which these organs can show their existence with the ability to build infrastructure to support activities. Generally, physical infrastructure in Islamic social organs is in the form of educational institution buildings, meeting rooms, offices with all facilities, houses of worship, business/business spaces such as shops/mini markets, etc. This indication can be seen clearly in the portraits of a number of salafi organs in Southeast Sulawesi.

Even though all salafi movements in Southeast Sulawesi have physical infrastructure, especially mosques and tahfiz houses. However, based on the author's in-depth observations, from all salafi organs in Southeast Sulawesi, there are two salafi communities that are fairly advanced, namely WI and ICM. These two institutions have school infrastructure that is fairly representative, "majestic" and spread across Southeast Sulawesi. ICM besides having educational infrastructure facilities in Waktobi and Kendari, this institution also has TV and radio as a means of transmitting salafism ideas to public spaces. Likewise with WI, the educational infrastructure facilities of this institution are spread across Kolaka, North Kolaka, Kendari, Bombana, South Konawe, Muna and West Muna. This reality is an indicator that both WI and ICM are quite existing and advanced and have the ability to surf in the socio-cultural dynamics of Southeast Sulawesi. The display of ideas in the form of artistic and "modern" physical infrastructure is clear evidence that the subject of this organ movement has the ability to manage/mobilize resources tactically.

As described earlier, financial capital is one of the motors that greatly determines the rate of movement of each social organ. To build mosques, schools and other physical facilities, a lot of funds are needed, as well as the operation and maintenance costs are also related to funds. Questions then; Does the salafi da'wah movement receive government

assistance? Or does the movement have funding sources from domestic and foreign funding? Or they grow with their own abilities in the sense of hoping from the solidarity of the congregation that is gathered in them.

Looking at the attacks of a number of figures against the salafi movement, among others Said Aqil Siraj (2021) who "almost" phoned the Wahhabi salafi as one of the perpetrators of violent crimes in the name of religion. Likewise with Nurwakhid's statement (2021) which states that most of the terrorist suspects arrested by Densus 88 and BNPT are Muslims with Wahhabi and Salafi jihadist backgrounds. With this stigma, according to the author, it is almost impossible for this group to get a share of the distribution of social funds from the government. If the suspicion of this movement then makes it impossible for the government to provide funds for salafi da'wah activities, especially in infrastructure development, then does that mean that the physical infrastructure facilities belonging to several salafi organs in Southeast Sulawesi are supporting funds from their congregations. Maybe yes, but it's a bit impossible if all the financing for the physical infrastructure is financed by infaq and sadaqah followers of Salafism. In other words, development funding support that comes from community solidarity is only a "small" supplement with a very minimal percentage. This assumption is not without basis, apart from seeing the fact that the infrastructure value is quite high, as well as the reality that activists of Islamic organizations generally come from the middle to lower economic group. These two facts quite postulate that the splendor of the infrastructure presented in the public space is allegedly closely related to financial support from outside donors.

The above assumption is at least supported by the fact of opinion emerging from a number of "rigid" salafi communities. Salafi groups that are "rigid" and or seem to distance themselves from the pursuit of external funding, grow very slowly. The case of Darul Ilmi, for example, who openly refuses to promote proposals, has implications for its slow growth. This group even criticized the salafi group who seemed

pragmatic. That the flow of funds flowing to salafi groups in Indonesia has become an open secret. In many analyses, these flows are mainly Saudi. It is strongly suspected that the funds were channeled by the Saudis to a number of countries including Indonesia as support for the spread of Wahhabism. Chaplin mentions; the strong relationship that exists between Saudi religious institutions and religious actors in Indonesia which is maintained through individual, professional, and even virtual relationships has increased the resonance of Salafi claims that represent Islam in line with the practices of the holiest place for Muslims and logistically increasing access to funding, either through private donors from abroad or foundations affiliated with Saudi interests (Chaplin, pp.217-236; Aswar, 2016, p.22; Kovacs, 2014, pp.4-5).

A number of donor organizations from Central Timor are actively channeling their assistance to salafi da'wah movements in Indonesia, including Jam'iyat Ihya' al-Turath al-Islami (JITI). This institution is known for disbursing a lot of funds for the benefit of spreading Wahhabi ideas in Indonesia (Hassan, pp.71-2; Rahmat, 2004, p.128). Another institution that is actively channeling funds for the construction of mosques and the development of Islamic education is the Mu'assasat al-Haramain (MH). MH is domiciled in Saudi Arabia and is fully supported by Saudi religious authorities. This institution works directly under the supervision of the ministry of Islamic affairs, and has a mission to develop true Islamic teachings and educate new generations. MH focuses on providing socio-religious assistance, such as building mosques through religious foundations in Indonesia.

According to Hassan, these institutions are a source of funding for the development of Wahhabism in the archipelago and at the same time for developing Wahhabi teachings globally. In Hidayat's notes, the first two institutions, namely JITI and MH, are linked to the salafi group WI (Hidayat, 86). However, the rising issue of terrorism in Indonesia has reduced the intensity of the flow of funds. Now all the flow of funds to the country from the Middle East must go through a process and a strict mechanism. This reality also happened to several

salafi institutions in Southeast Sulawesi. According to Khilal, these external funds are no longer as smooth as they were a few years ago, which can be obtained in large amounts. Now the flow of funds is coming in through individuals, brought directly by Shaykhs who visit and give lectures (interviews). In further developments, the mobilization of funds, especially from JITI, carried out by several salafi groups was used as ammunition to give a temporary label to other salafi groups. The war on stigma by refining the ways to hujr al-mubtadi (boycott) against several salafi groups that received funding from JITI seems to be continuing.

Apart from the labeling "perverted" between one group and another, the facts show that financial factors remain a fundamental driving element for the progress and development of social movements. This phenomenon becomes explicit and at the same time distinguishes one salafi movement from another. The salafi community which elegantly and wisely understands the "importance" of funds so as to open up a space for communication with the funders has in fact become more advanced, than the super rigid salafi community. In the context of Southeast Sulawesi, the case can be seen in the existence of WI and ICM, which are more advanced and their performances grow and develop into a more modern look, thereby attracting the hearts of the Muslim community in this region. On the other hand, some salafi groups, which are "selective" in collaborating with outside funding because they are seen as problematic and on the grounds that they are consistent in the "sunnah" path, have in fact not shown significant progress.

## **Conclusion**

The first contact of the people of Southeast Sulawesi with twentieth century salafism occurred in 1998, with Abu Izi as the central figure. The development and spread of salafism in Southeast Sulawesi, apart from being influenced by the systematic maneuvering of salafi followers, is also closely related to the openness of the state political structure after the fall of the New Order. Salafism is growing

and spreading massively, when a number of Middle Eastern alumni from Southeast Sulawesi return to this area. This phase was marked by the establishment of the ICM following WI which had existed before, and after that the salafism carriage increasingly showed its existence in Southeast Sulawesi. The development of salafism in Southeast Sulawesi is also supported or cannot be separated from the flow of funds from Middle Eastern funding.

In addition, the massive development of this organ is closely related to the ability of salafism actors in framing salafism ideas before they are transmitted. This approach is becoming more effective and has a positive impact on the development of salafism in Southeast Sulawesi, because the transmission of salafism ideas is channeled systematically both through conventional approaches and through modern communication networks, such as video, TV and FM radio. From a number of salafi groups in Southeast Sulawesi, prominent developments are seen in WI and ICM salafis. Factors supporting the development of the two communities, apart from good management and openness with other parties, are also due to their ability to mobilize their own resources properly. Meanwhile, other salafi communities tend to be rigid with the reason of maintaining stability and consistency in guarding the manhaj sunnah.

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